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Abstract
During the last ten years, the presence of sensor networks in common life has
become pervasive and sensor nodes are currently used in many areas of interest.
One of the most common radio communication protocol designed for Personal
Area Networks (PAN) is described by the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, according to
which data communication among devices can also be protected on a per frame
basis, so making it possible to assure data authenticity and confidentiality, and
security mechanisms can be configured in a flexible and effective way.
In this thesis work, the IEEE 802.15.4 security sublayer has been imple-
mented. In particular, the TinyOS implementation for the tmote sky mote
and the CC2420 chipset have been considered. The main goal of this work is
to extend the above mentioned MAC layer implementation in order to make
the IEEE 802.15.4 security mechanisms available, that is sending and receiv-
ing both ciphered and authenticated frames, by means of the security features
provided by the CC2420 chipset.
All security data structures and procedures have been implemented, so mak-
ing it possible to deal with different cryptographic keys usage and retrieval
modes. During the development phase, some problems strictly related to com-
putational and memory capacity shortage have been faced and properly ad-
dressed. Finally, the implemented security sublayer has been tested and eval-
uated by means of a simple application, which sends secured packets whose
payload changes both in content and size.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the last few years, the concept of sensors network has come to be the new
horizon of networking, looking forward to the idea of pervasive computing.
These systems are meant to support a large number of applications, many
of which are security sensitive, such as medical or environmental monitoring
instruments.
A sensor node (or mote) is a small battery supplied device endowed with a
sensing system able to collect various kind of data, a processing system which
orates information and a communication system which sends and shares data
with other motes. So, the big challenges are power consumption and complexity,
as well as costs.
In order to avoid retransmissions and saving battery power as well, com-
munications should be reliable. Besides, it could be necessary or desirable to
guarantee the origin of messages (authenticity), protect data from unauthorized
accesses (confidentiality) and prevent unwanted replays of received messages
(anti-replay). By doing so, it is more difficult for an adversary to modify or to
inject messages in order to alter data communications.
A technology suitable for sensors networks is described by the IEEE 802.15.4
standard: it describes wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical
(PHY) layers specifications for Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks
(LR-WPANs). IEEE 802.15.4 offers a wide range of security options: counter
mode encryption (CTR), authentication only mode (CBC-MAC) and a combi-
nation of them (CCM). Cryptography is based on AES (Advanced Encryption
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Standard) 128 bits symmetric-key cryptography. Thanks to the variety offered
by the standard, it is possible to tune the security level appropriate for a cer-
tain application. The security level is recognized by exploring the Auxiliary
Security Header and it is handled by means of specific data structures. These
contain security parameters and permit to validate and decipher messages in
a flexible and dynamic manner.
In this thesis work all the data structures and the security procedures de-
scribed by the standard, the four different Key Identifier Modes and their
management code, the routines support for device identificaton as well as keys
retrieval and management have been implemented.
During implementation work Tmote sky motes have been used since they
rely on an open source platform designed for experimentation within the re-
search community and they also include the CC2420 chipset which provides
extensive hardware support for packet handling and security mechanisms. The
nesC developing language and the TKN branch of the TinyOS environment
has been used [8].
In order to test the correctness of communications between a network coor-
dinator and some Reduced Function Devices (RFDs), it has been realized an
application which sends secured and unsecured packets and manages different
Security Levels according to a certain Key Identifier Mode. It is worth noting
that the device architecture affected all the project phases, especially during
testing and debugging. In fact, these phases turned out to be quite troublesome
because of the lack of powerful development environments as well as debugging
instruments.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: next chapter (Chapter 2)
provides a brief description of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and its security fea-
tures, while Chapter 3 describes the main features of TelosB motes and CC2420
chipset. Chapter 4 discusses the implementation of the security mechanisms.
Chapter 5 reports perfomances evaluation and, finally, Chapter 6 draws some
conclusive remarks.
Chapter 2
IEEE 802.15.4
2.1 Overview
IEEE 802.15.4 describes a protocol for communication among low-power de-
vices in Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs).
Two different device types can participate in an IEEE 802.15.4 network:
Full-Function Device (FFD) and Reduced-Function Device (RFD). A network
comprises at least one coordinator, that is a FFD capable of relaying mes-
sages from other devices. Plus, one coordinator is elected as the Personal Area
Network (PAN) Coordinator. An RFD, on the other hand, is intended to do
extremely simple applications, consequently, it can be implemented using min-
imal resources and memory capacity. An RFD is associated to a single PAN
coordinator at a time.
According to the application requirements, a network may be organized in
either two topologies: star topology and peer-to-peer topology (Figure 2.1). The
star topology mirrors the classic host-client network paradigm: all the messages
from devices must pass through the single central controller, called the PAN
coordinator; every device has to associate with the PAN coordinator to be part
of the network. Also in peer-to-peer topologies there is a PAN coordinator, but
any device is allowed to communicate with any other device (as long as they
are in range of one another) creating a mesh network if they are supposed to
do so.
The physical medium is accessed through a Carrier Sense Multiple Access
12
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Figure 2.1: Star and peer-to-peer topology examples
protocol, with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA). It can be used for channel
access either in an un-slotted version or in a time-slotted version with beacon
frames to keep motes synchronized. In time-slotted version, between every two
beacons, each device competes with others during the Contention Access Period
(CAP), while guaranteed time slots can be assigned during the Contention Free
Period (CFP).
Common data transmissions use unallocated slots when beaconing is in use;
confirmations do not follow the same process. Acknowledgement messages may
be optional under certain circumstances, in this case a success assumption is
made. Whatever the case, if a device is unable to process a frame at a given
time, it simply does not confirm its reception: timeout-based retransmissions
can be performed a number of times, following after that a decision of whether
to abort or to keep trying.
IEEE 802.15.4 specifies both PHY and MAC layer. The PHY layer acti-
vates and deactivates the radio transceiver, monitors energy detection and link
quality indicator for received packets, controls the Clear Channel Assessment
(CCA) for CSMA/CA and selects channel frequency and data transmission
and reception.
The MAC layer allows the transmission of the MAC frames through the
physical channel. It also offers beacon management, channel access, guaran-
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teed time slot management, frame validation, acknowledged frame delivery,
association and disassociation. In addition, the MAC sublayer provides hooks
for implementing application-appropriated security mechanisms. [6]
2.2 MAC frame structure
According to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [9], trasmissions are organized into
frames, which have been designed trying to keep complexity at a minimum. The
standard, while still assuring robustness for transmissions on a noisy channel,
provides four different frame structures that have specific functions:
• Data;
• Acknowledgment;
• Beacon;
• MAC Command.
Beacon frames are transmitted by a coordinator to implement significant
power saving modes or when attempting to establish a network, Data frames
and Acknowledgment frames are used for data transfers and to confirm suc-
cessful frame reception respectively. Finally, MAC command frames are used
to handle all MAC peer entity control transfers, sending low-level commands
from one node to another. Each further protocol layer is added to the structure
with layer-specific headers and footers.
2.2.1 Data frame structure
The data frame structure is similar to the other three frame types, its con-
tent is originated by the upper layers. The MAC payload is prefixed with the
MAC Header (MHR) and appended with the MAC Footer (MFR). The MHR
contains a two octets Frame Control Field, a single octet Data Sequence Num-
ber (DSN), Addressing Fields whose size changes according to the addressing
mode, and, optionally, a variable-length Auxiliary Security Header (ASH).
The MFR is composed of a 16-bit Frame Check Sequence (FCS). The MHR,
the MAC payload, and the MFR together form the MAC data frame (Figure
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Figure 2.2: Data Frame and PHY Packet
2.2). These fields compose the PHY payload. The PHY packet is completed
by the Synchronization Header (SHR) and the PHY header (PHR). The SHR
contains a preamble sequence to allow the receiver to acquire and synchronize
the incoming signal and a start of frame delimiter that signals the end of the
preamble. Besides, the PHR carries the frame length byte, which indicates the
length of the PHY payload.
2.3 MAC header and auxiliary security header
Figure 2.3: MAC Frame
The MAC frame is composed of the MAC header, the MAC payload, and
the MAC Footer. However, some fields like the addressing fields or the security
header might not be included in all frames, so it has a variable length, as shown
in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.4: Frame Control Field
2.3.1 Frame control field
The Frame Control Field is a two octets field. It contains information defining
the frame type, addressing fields type, and other control flags. It is formatted
as illustrated in Figure 2.4.
2.3.1.1 Frame type subfield
The Frame Type subfield contains the 3-bit encoding of the current frame type
(command, beacon, acknowledgment or data).
2.3.1.2 Security enabled subfield
The Security Enabled subfield is set to one if the frame is protected by the MAC
security sublayer and must be set to zero otherwise. The Auxiliary Security
Header field of the MHR is present only if this subfield is set to one.
2.3.1.3 Frame pending subfield
The Frame Pending subfield is set to one if the device sending the frame has
more data for the recipient. It is used only in beacon frames or frames trans-
mitted either during the CAP by devices operating on a beacon-enabled PAN
or at any time by devices operating on a nonbeacon-enabled PAN. Otherwise,
it shall be set to zero on transmission and ignored on reception.
2.3.1.4 Acknowledgment subfield
The Acknowledgment Request subfield is one bit in length and specifies whether
an acknowledgment is required from the recipient device when receiving a data
2.3. MAC header and auxiliary security header 17
or MAC command frame. If this subfield is set to one, the recipient device sends
an acknowledgment frame only if, on reception, the frame passes the third level
of filtering. If this subfield is set to zero, the recipient device will never send
acknowledgment frames.
2.3.1.5 PAN ID compression subfield
The PAN ID Compression subfield specifies whether the MAC frame to be sent
contains only one of the PAN identifier fields when both source and destination
addresses are present. If this subfield is set to one and both the source and
destination addresses are present, the frame has to contain only the Destination
PAN Identifier field, and the Source PAN Identifier field is assumed to be equal
to the destination’s.
2.3.1.6 Frame version subfield
The Frame Version subfield specifies the 2-bit encoding of the frame version.
2.3.1.7 Addressing mode subfields
Finally, the Destination Addressing Mode and the Source Addressing Mode
subfields indicate if address fields contain 16-bit short addresses or 64-bit ex-
tended addresses.
2.3.2 Auxiliary security header
Figure 2.5: Auxiliary Security Header
The Auxiliary Security Header has a variable length and, as shown in Fig-
ure 2.5, it contains information required for security processing, including the
Security Control Field, the Frame Counter Field, and the Key Identifier Field.
It is present only if the Security Enabled subfield of the Frame Control field is
set to one. It is formatted as illustrated in Figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.6: Auxiliary Security Header Structure
2.3.2.1 Security control subfield
Figure 2.7: Security Control Subfield
The 8-bit Security Control field is used to provide information about what
kind of protection is applied to the frame. The Security Control Field has to
be formatted as shown in Figure 2.7.
The Security Level subfield is three bit in length and indicates the actual
frame protection provided. This value can be adapted on a frame-by-frame
basis and allows for varying levels of data authenticity (to allow minimization
of security overhead in transmitted frames where required) and for optional
data confidentiality. Table 2.1 summarizes all security levels available.
The Key Identifier Mode subfield is two bit in length and indicates whether
the key used to protect the frame can be derived implicitly or explicitly. Fur-
thermore, it is used to indicate the particular representation of the Key Iden-
tifier field, if the key is derived explicitly. The Key Identifier Mode subfield is
set according to Table 2.2. The Key Identifier field of the Auxiliary Security
Header is present only if this subfield has a value not equal to 0x00.
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Security Level Security Control Security Data Data
Identifier Field Attributes confidentiality authenticity
0x00 ’000’ None OFF NO (M = 0)
0x01 ’001’ MIC-32 OFF YES (M = 4)
0x02 ’010’ MIC-64 OFF YES (M = 8)
0x03 ’011’ MIC-128 OFF YES (M = 16)
0x04 ’100’ ENC ON NO (M =0)
0x05 ’011’ ENC-MIC-32 ON YES (M = 4)
0x06 ’110’ ENC-MIC-64 ON YES (M = 8)
0x07 ’111’ ENC-MIC-128 ON YES (M = 16)
Table 2.1: Security Level values and options
Key Identifier Security Description
Key Identifier
mode Mode subfield
field length
(octets)
0x00 ’00’
Key is determined implicitly from the
0originator and receipient(s) of the frame
as indicated in the frame header.
0x01 ’01’
Key is determined from the 1-octet Key
1
Index subfield of the Key Identifier Field
of the auxiliary security header in
conjunction with macDefaultKeySource.
0x02 ’10’
Key is determined explicitly from the
5
4-octet Key Source subfield and the
1-octet Key Index subfield of the Key
Identifier Field of the auxiliary security
header
0x03 ’11’
Key is determined explicitly from the
9
8-octet Key Source subfield and the
1-octet Key Index subfield of the Key
Identifier Field of the auxiliary security
header.
Table 2.2: Key Identifier values and options
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2.3.2.2 Frame counter field
The Frame Counter field is a 4-octets field representing the macFrameCounter
attribute of the originator of a protected frame. It is used to assure replay
protection.
2.3.2.3 Key identifier field
Figure 2.8: Key Identifier Field
The Key Identifier field has variable length and is used for cryptographic
protection of outgoing frames, either explicitly or in conjunction with implicitly
defined side information. The Key Identifier field is present only if the Key
Identifier Mode subfield of the Security Control field of the Auxiliary Security
Header is set to a value different from 0x00. The Key Identifier field is formatted
as illustrated in Figure 2.8.
The Key Source subfield, if present, is either four octets or sixteen octets
in length, according to the value specified by the Key Identifier Mode subfield
of the Security Control field, and indicates the originator of a group key. The
Key Index subfield is one octet in length and allows unique identification of
different keys having the same originator.
2.4 Security structures
The MAC sublayer is responsible for providing security services on specified
incoming and outgoing frames, when requested by the higher layers. The in-
formation according to which is determined how to provide security is located
in the security-related PIB (PAN Information Base) [9]. This security-related
PIB is divided in seven structures:
• Key Table;
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• Device Table;
• Minimum security level table;
• Frame counter;
• Automatic request attributes;
• Default key source;
• PAN coordinator address.
The Key table contains key-descriptors, which are keys with related key-
specific information required for security processing.
The device table holds device-descriptors, containing device-specific address-
ing and security-related information which, combined with key-specific infor-
mation from the key table, provide all the keying material needed to secure/un-
secure frames.
The minimum security level table holds information regarding the mini-
mum security level the device expects having applied by the originator of a
frame, depending on frame type and, if it concerns a MAC command frame,
the command frame identifier.
The four octets frame counter is used to provide replay protection and se-
mantic security of the cryptographic building block used for securing outgoing
frames. Such counter is an integer which is incremented every time an outgo-
ing frame is secured. When the frame counter reaches its maximum value of
0xffffffff, the associated keying material can no longer be used, thus requiring
all keys to be updated.
The Automatic Request table holds all the information needed to secure
outgoing frames generated automatically and not as a result of a higher layer
primitive, as is the case with automatic data requests.
The default key source is commonly shared between originator and recipi-
ent(s) of a secured frame, so that, when combined with additional information
explicitly contained in the requesting primitive or in the received frame, it al-
lows an originator or a recipient to determine the key required for securing or
unsecuring the frame, respectively. The address of the PAN coordinator is an
information commonly shared between all devices in a PAN. The code of the
implementation can be seen in Appendix A.
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2.5 Security modes
The 802.15.4 security layer is handled at the MAC layer, below application
control. The application specifies its security requirements by setting the ap-
propriate control parameters into the radio stack. If an application does not set
any parameters, then security is not enabled by default. An application must
explicitly enable security.
The specification does not support security for acknowledgement packets;
other packet types can optionally support integrity protection and confiden-
tiality protection. An application has a choice of security suites that control
the type of security protection that is provided for the transmitted data. Each
security suite offers a different set of security properties and guarantees, and
ultimately different packet formats.
The 802.15.4 specification defines eight different security suites. We can
broadly classify them by the properties they offer: no security (NO SEC), en-
cryption only (CTR), authentication only (CBC MAC), and both encryption
and authentication (CCM). Each category that supports authentication comes
in three variants depending on the size of the MIC it offers. Each variant is
considered a different security suite and has its own name. In fact, the Mes-
sage Integrity Code (MIC) can be either four, eight, or sixteen bytes long. The
longer the MIC is, the lower is the chance an adversary has to blind forgery by
guessing an appropriate code.
An application indicates the chosen security suite in the MAC frame header.
802.15.4 radio chips control what security suite and keying information to use.
The security material is the persistent state necessary to execute the security
suite. The application must specify a boolean indicating whether security is
enabled. If no security is requested, the packet is sent out as is.
On packet reception, the MAC layer consults the packet flags field in order
to determine if any security suite has been applied to that packet. If no security
is used, the packet is passed as is to the application. Otherwise, the appropri-
ate security suite, such as key and replay counter, is applied to the incoming
packet, presenting the application with an error message if the procedure fails
somewhat. In the following sections will be provided more details about the
above-mentioned security suites.
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2.5.1 NO SEC
This is the simplest security suite. Its inclusion is mandatory in all radio chips.
It does not manage any security material and it does not provide any security
guarantees.
2.5.2 CTR
Figure 2.9: CTR Frame Format
This suite provides confidentiality protection using the AES block cipher
with counter mode. To encrypt data under counter mode, the sender breaks
the cleartext packet into 16-byte blocks and computes ci = pi ⊕ Ek(xi). Each
16-byte block uses its own varying counter, which we call x1. The recipient
recovers the original plaintext by computing pi = ci ⊕ Ek(xi). Clearly, the
recipient needs the counter value x1 in order to reconstruct pi .
The x1 counter, known as a nonce, is composed of a static flags field, the
senders address, and three separate counters: a 4-byte frame counter that iden-
tifies the packet, a 1-byte key counter field, and a 2-byte block counter that
numbers the 16-byte blocks within the packet. The sender increments the frame
counter after encrypting each packet. When it reaches its maximum value, the
radio returns an error code and the key has to be changed. The requirement is
that the nonce must never repeat within the lifetime of any single key, and the
role of the frame and key counters is to prevent nonce reuse. The block counter
ensures that each block will use a different nonce value; the sender does not
need to include it within the packet, since the receiver can infer its value for
each block.
As shown in Figure 2.9, the sender includes in the packet three main com-
ponents: the frame counter, key counter, and encrypted payload into the data
payload field of the packet.
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2.5.3 CBC MAC
Figure 2.10: CBC MAC Frame Format
This suite provides integrity protection using CBC MAC. The sender can
compute either a four, eight, or sixteen bytes Message Integrity Code (MIC)
using the CBC MAC algorithm, leading to three different variants. The MIC
can only be computed by parties with the symmetric key and can protect
packet headers as well as the data payload. The sender appends the plaintext
data with the MIC.
The recipient verifies the MAC by computing the MAC and comparing it
with the value included in the packet, deciding wether the packet is authenti-
cated or not. Figure 2.10 shows the format of this packet.
2.5.4 CCM
Figure 2.11: CCM Frame Format
This security suite uses CCM mode for both encryption and authentication.
Broadly, it first applies integrity protection over the header and data payload
using CBC MAC and then encrypts both the data payload and the MIC using
CTR. So CCM combines the fields from both the authentication and encryption
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operations such as the MIC and the frame counter. These fields serve the same
function as above. As CBC MAC, also CCM has three variants depending on
the MIC size. Figure 2.11 shows the format of this packet.
2.6 Key identifier modes
The Key Identifier Mode subfield is two bits in length and indicates whether
the key used in order to protect the frame can be derived implicitly or explicitly.
Furthermore, it is used to indicate the particular representations of the Key
Identifier field if it si derived explicitly. The Key Identifier Mode subfield shall
be set to one of the values listed in the following sections. This field specifies
the mode used in order to identify and retrieve the key used by the originator
of the received frame. This parameter is ignored if the SecurityLevel parameter
is set to 0x00.
There are four different modes: KeyIdMode0, KeyIdMode1, KeyIdMode2
and KeyIdMode3. The increment of the index corresponds to an enhancement
of their peculiarities, but also of their complexity. The KeyIdMode0 just allows
two or more nodes to send or receive data secured with a static, uniform, sin-
gle key. The KeyIdMode1 provides more keys, selected from a single KeyTable
thanks to the KeyIndex subfield of the Auxiliary Security Header. The keyTable
is located at the default index written in the MacDefaultKeySource field of
the PIB structure. This mode allows a key change just changing the index
of the default key table. The two modes left are the most complex and com-
plete. The KeyIdMode2 and KeyIdMode3 provide, besides the KeyIndex, also
a KeySourceAddress which locates a different KeyTable filled with some differ-
ent KeyDescriptors. So distinct devices are allowed to secure data using keys
provided by different sources.
2.6.1 KeyIdMode0
Figure 2.12: KeyIdMode0 Security Subheader Format
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The key is determined implicitly from the originator and receipient(s) of the
frame, as indicated by the frame header whose structure is shown in Figure
2.12.
2.6.2 KeyIdMode1
Figure 2.13: KeyIdMode1 Security Subheader Format
The key is determined from the 1-octet Key Index subfield of the Key Iden-
tifier field of the auxiliary security header in conjunction with macDefault-
KeySource. The structure of the Auxialiary Security Header for this KeyId-
Mode is shown in Figure 2.13.
2.6.3 KeyIdMode2
Figure 2.14: KeyIdMode2 Security Subheader Format
The key is determined explicitly from the 4-octet Key Source subfield and
the 1-octet Key Index subfield of the Key Identifier field. The structure of the
Auxialiary Security Header for this KeyIdMode is shown in Figure 2.14.
2.6.4 KeyIdMode3
Figure 2.15: KeyIdMode3 Security Subheader Format
The key is determined explicitly from the 8-octet Key Source subfield and
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the 1-octet Key Index subfield of the Key Identifier field. The structure of the
Auxialiary Security Header for this KeyIdMode is shown in Figure 2.15.
Chapter 3
Tmote sky and CC2420
3.1 Tmote sky
Figure 3.1: A simple Tmote Sky mote
A sensor node, also known as a ’mote’, is a node used in a wireless sensor
network. It can perform various kind of processing: it can monitor applications,
it can gather sensory information and it can set up network connections with
other motes forming a network. As can be seen in Figure 3.1, one point of
strength about motes is their small dimension, combined with industry stan-
28
3.1. Tmote sky 29
dards like USB, so providing flexible interconnection with peripherals [5].
Figure 3.2: Components of a Tmote Sky mote
In the Figure 3.2, we can see the components of the mote: an antenna, to
send and receive data; a microcontroller to perform tasks, process data and
control the functionality of other components in the sensor node; three leds,
useful to signal certain events or for debugging and an AA battery slot. A
generic sensor has five subsystems (Figure 3.1), each one with a specific task:
• Sensing subsystem;
• Processing subsystem;
• Communication subsystem;
• Actuation subsystem;
• Power management subsystem.
The sensing subsystem is designed to get information about the environment
used by other subsystems. The processing subsystem is designated to take
data from the sensing subsystem and to elaborate them so making it possible
they can be used by others. The communication subsystem sends and receives
packets. The power management subsystem concerns all the operations about
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Figure 3.3: Functional blocks of a generic mote
battery managing (e.g. power saving). Finally, the actuation subsystem gets
information from sensing and processing and decides how to control and make
the system evolve.
The motes used developing this thesis are Tmote sky: it is an open source
platform designed to enable cutting-edge experimentation for the research com-
munity. As [5] explains, the key Features of this suite are:
• IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee compliant RF transceiver;;
• Interoperability with other IEEE 802.15.4 devices;
• 8MHz CC2420 microcontroller (10k RAM, 48k Flash);
• Integrated onboard antenna;
• Low current consumption;
• Programming and data collection via USB;
• Runs TinyOS 1.1.10 or higher.
3.2 CC2420 chipset
CC2420 is the chipset Tmote sky motes use. It provides hardware support
for the cryptographic primitives and is used in several applications: Zigbee
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and TinyOS systems, home and building automation, industrial control and
wireless sensor networks.
The CC2420 is a single-chip 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4 compliant transceiver
designed for low power and low voltage wireless applications. It provides exten-
sive hardware support for packet handling, data buffering, burst transmissions,
data encryption, data authentication, clear channel assessment, link quality
indication and packet timing information. Between its many features, we can
highlight the separate transmit and receive FIFOs, the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC
hardware support (CRC 16 computation, Energy Detection, Link Quality de-
tection, etc.) and IEEE 802.15.4 MAC hardware security (CTR encryption/de-
cryption, CBC MAC authentication CCM encryption/decryption and authen-
tication, stand-alone AES encryption) [1].
3.2.1 Configuration and Data Interface
There are thirty-three 16-bit configuration and status registers, fifteen com-
mand strobe registers, and two 8-bit registers to access the separate transmit
and receive FIFOs. Each data register is addressed by a 6-bit address. In each
register read or write cycle, twenty-fours bits are read. Also the configuration
registers can be read by the microcontroller.
CC2420 then returns the data from the addressed register in sixteen clock
cycles. After the transfer, the CC2420 status byte is returned on the SO pin.
The status byte contains 6 status bit whose configuration is described in Table
3.1. A SNOP (no operation) command strobe may be used to read the status
byte.
Command strobes may be viewed as single byte instruction to CC2420.
These commands must be used to enable receive mode, start decryption etc.
All command strobes can be viewed in Table 3.2.
3.2.2 RAM access
CC240 also has 368 bytes RAM that can be accessed through the SPI interface.
These registers contain a one-to -one mapping of the FIFO registers, the KEY0
and the KEY1 registers, the RXNONCE and the TXNONCE registers. This
3.2. CC2420 chipset 32
Bit # Name Description
7 Reserved, ignore value
6 XOSC16M STABLE
Indicates whether the 16 MHz oscillator is running or not
0 : The 16 MHz crystal oscillator is not running
1 : The 16 MHz crystal oscillator is running
5 TX UNDERFLOW
Indicates whether a FIFO underflow has occurred during
transmission. It must be cleared manually with a SFLUSHTX
command strobe.
0 : No underflow has occurred
1 : An underflow has occurred
4 ENC BUSY
Indicates whether the encryption module is busy
0 : Encryption module is idle
1 : Encryption module is busy
3 TX ACTIVE
Indicates whether RF transmission is active
0 : RF Transmission is idle
1 : RF Transmission is active
2 LOCK
Indicates whether the frequency synthesizer PLL is in lock or not
0 : The PLL is out of lock
1 : The PLL is in lock
1 RSSI VALID
Indicates whether the RSSI value is valid or not.
0 : The RSSI value is not valid
1 : The RSSI value is valid, always true when reception has been
enabled at least 8 symbol periods
0 Reserved, ignore value
Table 3.1: Status byte flags
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Address Register Description
0x00 SNOP No Operation (has no other effect than reading out status-bits)
0x01 SXOSCON
Turn on the crystal oscillator (set XOSC16M PD = 0 and
BIAS PD = 0)
0x02 STXCAL
Enable and calibrate frequency synthesizer for TX. Go from
RX/TX to a wait state where only the synthesizer is running.
0x03 SRXON Enable RX
0x04 STXON
Enable TX after calibration (if not already performed)
Start TX in-line encryption if SPI SEC MODE = 0
0x05 STXONCCA
If CCA indicates a clear channel:Enable calibration, then TX.
Start in-line encryption if SPI SEC MODE = 0, else do nothing.
0x06 SRFOFF Disable RX/TX and frequency synthesizer
0x07 SXOSCOFF Turn off the crystal oscillator and RF
0x08 SFLUSHRX
Flush the RX FIFO buffer and reset the demodulator. Always
read at least one byte from the RXFIFO before issuing the
SFLUSHRX command strobe
0x09 SFLUSHRX Flush the TX FIFO buffer
0x0A SACK Send acknowledge frame, with pending field cleared
0x0B SACKPEND Send acknowledge frame, with pending field set
0x0C SRXDEC
Start RXFIFO in-line decryption/authentication (as set by
SPI SEC MODE)
0x0D STXENC
Start TXFIFO in-line encryption/authentication (as set by
SPI SEC MODE), without starting TX
0x0E SAES
AES Stand alone encryption strobe. SPI SEC MODE is not
required to be 0, but the encryption module must be idle. If not,
the strobe is ignored
Table 3.2: Strobe configuration registers overview
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mapping is very useful to make debugging, in fact the TXFIFO is write only,
but it may be read back using RAM access.
Data are read and written one byte at a time, as with RAM access. The
RXFIFO is both writeable and readable. KEY0 and KEY1 registers contain
a 16-bit key used for ciphering/deciphering operation. After a key is writ-
ten in any of these registers, it is selected and then used when reading the
SEC TXKEYSEL/SEC RXKEYSEL bit in SECCTRL0 register. TXNONCE
and RXNONCE contain nonce.
3.2.3 Security operations
CC2420 features hardware IEEE 802.15.4 MAC security operations. This in-
cludes counter mode (CTR) encryption/decryption, CBC MAC authentication
and CCM encryption and authentication. All security operations are based on
AES encryption using 128 bit keys and they are performed within the transmit
and receive FIFOs on a per-frame basis.
The SAES, STXENC and SRXDEC command strobes are used to start
security operations in CC2420 as will be described in the following sections. The
ENC BUSY status bit may be used to monitor when a security operation has
been completed. Security command strobes issued while the security engine is
busy, will be ignored and the ongoing operation will be completed. The CC2420
RAM space has storage space for two individual keys (KEY0 and KEY1).
Transmit, receive and stand-alone encryption may select one of these two
keys relying on the three control bits SEC TXKEYSEL, SEC RXKEYSEL
and SEC SAKEYSEL in the SECCTRL0 register. A way of establishing the
keys used for encryption and authentication must be decided considering the
particular application requirements. IEEE 802.15.4, in fact, does not define how
this is done, it is left to the higher layers of the protocol. However, the nonce
must be correctly initialized before starting any reception or transmission [7].
The in-line security mode is set in SECCTRL0.SEC MODE to one of the
following modes:
• NO SEC (disabled);
• CBC MAC (authentication);
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• CTR (encryption/decryption);
• CCM (authentication and encryption/decryption).
When enabled, transmission (TX) in-line security is started in two differ-
ent ways: the first one is issuing the STXENC command strobe, so in-line
security will be performed within the TXFIFO buffer, but a transmission will
not be started. The second one is issuing the STXON or STXONCCA com-
mand strobe, so in-line security will be performed within the TXFIFO and a
transmission of the ciphertext is started.
When enabled, reception (RX) in-line security is started issuing a SRXDEC
command strobe, so the first frame in the RXFIFO buffer is decrypted/au-
thenticated as set by the current security mode. RX in-line security operations
are always performed on the first frame currently inside the RXFIFO, even
if parts of this has already been read out over the Serial Peripheral Interface
(SPI). This allows the receiver to first read the source address out, making it
possible to decide which key to use before doing authentication of the com-
plete frame. In CTR or CCM mode it is of course important that bytes to be
decrypted are not read out before the security operation is started.
3.2.3.1 CTR mode encryption/decryption
CTR mode encryption/decryption is performed by CC2420 on MAC frames
within the TXFIFO/RXFIFO respectively. SECCTRL1.SEC TXL/SEC RXL
flags in this control register set the number of bytes between the length field
and the first byte to be encrypted/decrypted respectively, so controlling the
number of plaintext bytes in the current frame.
When encryption is initiated, the plaintext in the TXFIFO is then en-
crypted. The encryption module will encrypt all the plaintext currently avail-
able or it will wait if not everything is prebuffered. The encryption operation
may also be started without any data in the TXFIFO at all, and data will
be encrypted as soon as they are written to the TXFIFO. When decryption is
initiated issuing the SRXDEC command strobe, the ciphertext of the RXFIFO
is then decrypted.
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3.2.3.2 CBC MAC
CBC MAC in-line authentication is provided by CC2420 hardware. When en-
abling CBC MAC in-line TXFIFO authentication, the generated MIC is writ-
ten to the TXFIFO for transmission. The frame length must include the MIC.
SECCTRL1.SEC TXL/SEC RXL flags in this control register set the num-
ber of bytes between the length field and the first byte to be authenticated.
Normally it is set to 0 for MAC authentication. SECCTRL0.SEC M flag in
this control register set the MIC length M, encoded as (M − 2)/2. SECC-
TRL0.SEC CBC HEAD flag defines if the authentication length is used as the
first byte of data to be authenticated or not. This bit should be set to one.
When enabling CBC-MAC in-line RXFIFO authentication, the generated
MIC is compared to the MIC in the RXFIFO. The last byte of the MIC is
replaced in the RXFIFO with 0x00 if MIC is correct or 0xFF if MIC is incorrect.
3.2.3.3 CCM
CCM combines CTR mode encryption and CBC MAC authentication in a
single operation. SECCTRL0.SEC M flag sets the MIC length M, encoded as
(M − 2)/2. SECCTRL0.SEC CBC HEAD flag defines if the authentication
length is used as the first byte of data to be authenticated or not. This bit
should be set to one. SECCTRL1.SEC TXL/SEC RXL sets the number of
bytes after the length field to be authenticated but not encrypted. The MIC is
generated and verified in the same way descibed in the CBC-MAC subsection.
3.2.3.4 Nonce structure
The receive and transmit nonces used for encryption and decryption are lo-
cated in RAM, starting from addresses 0x110 and 0x140 respectively. They are
both sixteen bytes. The nonce must be correctly initialized before receiving or
transmitting secured frames. The format of the nonce is shown in Figure 3.4.
The standard imposes the block counter to be set to one, the key sequence
counter is controlled by a layer above the MAC layer. The frame counter must
be increased at each new frame by the MAC layer. The source address is the
64-bit IEEE address.
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Figure 3.4: IEEE 802.15.4 Nonce
CC2420 gives the user full flexibility in selecting the flags for nonces accord-
ing to the chosen security level. The flag setting is stored in the most significant
byte of the nonce. The flag byte used for encryption and authentication is then
generated as shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: CC2420 Security Flag Byte
Chapter 4
Security implementation
4.1 Overview
IEEE 802.15.4 offers several ways to secure a frame: packets can be only en-
crypted, only authenticated or both encrypted and authenticated. In our sce-
nario, we consider some Reduced Function Devices (RFDs) transmitting data
with different security levels to the Full Function Device (FFD) coordinator,
that decrypts messages and sends back acks. When security is turned off, upper
layers does not send to MAC any security parameters: when the frame is built,
security routines are not called and the frame is sent in clear.
At the startup of the application, both RFDs and FFD set their security
data structures, such as Key Table and Device Table, according to the security
parameters they are going to use. Then, while parsing the frames, the coor-
dinator understands whether it has security or not and, eventually, recognizes
the security level, behaving appropriately
When security is active, the first step consists in verifying consistency be-
tween table contents and security parameters. If these checks succeed, the Aux-
iliary Security Header is built and inserted into the MAC frame. Finally, the
proper security routines are called before sending the frame.
The coordinator, while parsing the frame, understands that it is secured
and then proceeds to unsecure it in a coherent manner. It makes the consis-
tency checks too, so verifying the correctness of its table contents. If everything
works, it recognizes the security level and unsecures the packet relying on the
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opportune security routines [10].
The security parameters mentioned before are overviewed by Table 4.1 and
will be deeply explained later.
Name Type Range Description
SecurityLevel Integer 0x00-0x07 The security level to be used
KeyIdMode Integer 0x00-0x03
The mode used in order to identify
the key to be used
Key Source
Set of 0
As specified by the
The originator of the key to be used.
4, or 8
KeyIdMode parameter
It is ignored if the KeyIdMode
octets parameter is ignored or set to 0x00.
KeyIndex Integer 0x01-0xff
The index of the key to be used. It
is ignored if the KeyIdMode
parameter is ignored or set to 0x00
Table 4.1: Security Parameters
This security structure is used by application layer to manage the security
parameters when the frame is created. The implementation of the security
structure is1:
typedef struct i e e e 1 5 4 s e c u r i t y {
u i n t 8 t Secu r i tyLeve l ;
u i n t 8 t KeyIdMode ;
u i n t 8 t KeySource [ 8 ] ;
u i n t 8 t KeyIndex ;
} i e e e 1 5 4 s e c u r i t y t ;
The following section deeply describes the security data structures imple-
mentation and their functionalities.
4.2 Security data structures
The PIB security-related attributes are presented in Table 4.2. Among them,
the MacKeyTable and the MacDeviceTable are the most important security
1All the code is Copyright (c) 2008, Technische Universitaet Berlin All rights reserved
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data structure. Mainly, they are a set of KeyDescriptor and DeviceDescriptor
respectively.
Attribute Identifier Type Range Description Default
macKey-
0x71
List of
-
A table of Key-
(empty)
Table
KeyDescriptor
Descriptors,
entries
each containing
keys and
related-security
information
macKey-
0x72 Integer
Implementa-
The number of
0Table-
tion specific
entries in mac-
Entries KeyTable
macDevice-
0x73
List of
-
A table of De-
(empty)
Table
Device-
viceDescriptor
Descriptor
entries, each
entries
indicating a
remote device
with which this
one securely
communicates
macDevice-
0x74 Integer
Implementa-
The number of
0Table-
tion specific
entries in mac-
Entries DeviceTable
mac
0x75
Table of
-
A table of Secu-
(empty)Security-
SecurityLevel
rityLevel-
LevelTable
Descriptor
Descriptors,
entries
holding
information
about the
minimum secu-
rity level
expected
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Attribute Identifier Type Range Description Default
mac
0x76 Integer
Implementa-
The number of
0
Security-
tion specific
entries in mac-
LevelTable- SecurityLevel
Entries Table
macFrame-
0x77 Integer
0x00000000- The outgoing 0x00
Counter 0xffffffff frame counter
macAuto
0x78 Integer 0x00-0x07
The security
0x06
Request level used for
Security- automatic
Level data request
macAuto
0x79 Integer 0x00-0x03
KeyIdMode
0x00Request-
used for auto-
KeyIdMode
matic data
request
macAuto-
0x7a
As specified
-
The originator
All 0xffRequest-
by the mac- of the key
KeySource
AutoRequest- used for auto-
KeyId- matic data
Mode request
macAuto-
0x7b Integer 0x01-0xff
The index of
All 0xffRequest-
the key used
KeyIndex
for automatic
data request
macDefault-
0x7c Set of 8 octets -
The originator
All 0xff
KeySource
of the default
key used for
KeyIdMode1
macPAN-
0x7d
IEEE address An extended 64-bit address
-Coord- 64-bit IEEE of the PAN
Extended- address coordinator
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Attribute Identifier Type Range Description Default
Address
MacPAN-
0x73 Integer 0x0000-0xffff
16-bit address
0x0000
Coord-
of the PAN
Short-
coordinator
Address
Table 4.2: MAC security-related PIB
4.2.1 KeyTable
The key table holds KeyDescriptors, particular data structures able to provide
key-specific information. These are retrieved thanks to some parameters ex-
plicitly contained in the requesting primitive or in the received frame, and are
involved in the outgoing frame key retrieval procedure and the incoming frame
security material retrieval procedure, as well as the KeyDescriptor lookup pro-
cedure. All these procedures will be described starting from Section 4.4. The
implementation of this data structure is the following:
typedef struct ieee154 macKeyTable t {
i e e e154 KeyDesc r i p to r t k eyde s c r i p t o r
[MAX MAC KEY TABLE ENTRIES ] ;
bool v a l i d [MAX MAC KEY TABLE ENTRIES ] ;
} ieee154 macKeyTable t ;
4.2.1.1 KeyDescriptor structure
The following rapresents the ieee154 KeyDescriptor t nesC implementation:
typedef struct i e e e154 KeyDesc r i p to r t {
i e e e154 LookupDesc r ip to r t
k ey id l ookupde s c r i p to r [MAX MAC KEY ID LOOKUP LIST ENTRIES ] ;
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u i n t 8 t k ey id l ookupen t r i e s ;
i e e e154 KeyDev i c eDesc r ip to r t
k e y d e v i c e l i s [MAX MAC DEVICE LIST ENTRIES ] ;
u i n t 8 t k e y d e v i c e l i s t e n t r i e s ;
i e ee154 KeyUsageDescr ip tor t
k e yu s a g e l i s t [MAX MAC KEY USAGE LIST ENTRIES ] ;
u i n t 8 t k e y u s a g e l i s t e n t r i e s ;
i e e e154 Key t key [ 1 6 ] ;
} i e e e154 KeyDesc r i p to r t ;
4.2.2 DeviceTable
The device table holds DeviceDescriptors, containing device-specific addressing
information that, when combined with key-specific information from the key
table, provide all the keying material needed to secure outgoing and unsecure
incoming frames. Device-specific information in the device table is identified
based on the originator of the frame, as described in the blacklist checking
procedure we are going to describe in Section 4.5.3.1. The implementation of
this data structure is:
typedef struct i eee154 macDeviceTable t {
i e e e 1 54 Dev i c eDe s c r i p t o r t d e v i c e d e s c r i p t o r [MAX SEC TABLE ENTRIES ] ;
bool v a l i d [MAX SEC TABLE ENTRIES ] ;
} i eee154 macDeviceTable t ;
4.2.2.1 DeviceDescriptor structure
The following rapresents the ieee154 DeviceDescriptor t nesC implementation:
typedef struct i e e e 1 54 Dev i c eDe s c r i p t o r t {
ieee154 macPANId t panid ;
i e e e 1 5 4 add r e s s t address ;
ieee154 macFrameCounter t framecounter ;
bool exempt ;
} i e e e 1 54 Dev i c eDe s c r i p t o r t ;
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4.2.3 Minimum security level table
The minimum security level table holds information regarding the minimum
security level the device expects to have been applied by the originator of a
frame, depending on frame type and, if it concerns a MAC command frame,
the command frame identifier. Security processing of an incoming frame will
fail if the frame is not adequately protected.
4.2.4 Frame counter
The 4-octet frame counter is used to provide replay protection and semantic
security of the cryptographic building block used for securing outgoing frames.
The frame counter is included in each secured frame and is one of the elements
required for the unsecuring operation at the recipient(s).
The frame counter is incremented each time an outgoing frame is secured,
as described in the outgoing frame security procedure (Section 4.4). When the
frame counter reaches its maximum value of 0xffffffff, the associated keying
material is blacklisted, requiring all keys associated with the device to be up-
dated. This provides a mechanism for ensuring that the keying material for
every frame is unique and, thereby, provides for sequential freshness.
4.2.5 Automatic request attributes
Automatic request attributes hold all the information needed to secure out-
going frames generated automatically and not as a result of a higher layer
primitive, as is the case with automatic data requests.
4.2.6 Default key source
The default key source is an information commonly shared between originator
and receipient(s) of a secured frame, which, when combined with additional
information explicitly contained in the requesting primitive or in the received
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frame, allows an originator or a recipient to determine the key required for
securing or unsecuring this frame, respectively.
This provides a mechanism for significantly reducing the overhead of security
information contained in secured frames in particular use cases.
4.2.7 PAN coordinator address
The address of the PAN coordinator is an information commonly shared be-
tween all devices in a PAN, which, when combined with additional information
explicitly contained in the requesting primitive or in the received frame, allows
an originator of a frame directed to the PAN coordinator or a recipient of a
frame originating from the PAN coordinator to determine the key and security-
related information required for securing or unsecuring this frame.
4.3 Security functional description
Security implementation is optional on a device. When a device does not im-
plement security, it shall not provide a mechanism for the MAC sublayer to
perform any cryptographic transformation on incoming and outgoing frames
nor require any PIB attributes associated with security.
A device that implements security, on the other hand, shall provide a mech-
anism for the MAC sublayer to provide cryptographic transformations on in-
coming and outgoing frames using information in the PIB attributes associated
with security when the macSecurityEnabled attribute is set to TRUE.
If the MAC sublayer is required to transmit a frame or receives an incoming
frame, the MAC sublayer shall process the frame as descibed in Figure 4.1 and
Figure 4.4, respectively.
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4.4 Outgoing frame security procedure
The inputs to this procedure are:
• the frame to be secured;
• SecurityLevel;
• KeyIdMode;
• KeySource;
• KeyIndex.
The outputs from this procedure are the status of the procedure and, if it
is SUCCESS, the secured frame.
Figure 4.1: Outgoing frame security procedure schema
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Fist of all, the procedure does some consistency controls and, if everything
works, it shall obtain the key using the outgoing frame key retrieval procedure
as described in Figure 4.3. In case of failure, the procedure shall return with
a status of UNAVAILABLE KEY. Otherwise, it proceeds with the auxiliary
security header insertion and the encryption/authentication. Finally, the pro-
cedure updates the frame counter to the macFrameCounter attribute. If the
frame counter has the value 0xffffffff, the procedure shall return with a status
of COUNTER ERROR.
4.4.1 Outgoing frame consistency checks
Figure 4.2 describes the consistency checks we are going to enumerate.
Figure 4.2: Outgoing frame consistency checks
If the Security Enabled subfield of the Frame Control field of the frame to
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be secured is set to zero, the procedure shall set the security level to zero.
If the Security Enabled subfield of the Frame Control field of the frame
to be secured is set to one, the procedure shall set the security level to the
SecurityLevel parameter. If the resulting security level is zero, the procedure
shall return with a status of UNSUPPORTED SECURITY.
If the macSecurityEnabled attribute is set to FALSE and the security level
is not equal to zero, the procedure shall return with a status of UNSUP-
PORTED SECURITY.
Then, the procedure shall determine whether the frame to be secured fits
the maximum length of MAC frames payload: the procedure shall set the size
(M) of the Authentication field to zero if the security level is equal to zero and
shall determine this value from the security level otherwise. The procedure shall
determine the AuxLen, that is the length, in octets, of the auxiliary security
header using the KeyIdMode and the security level. If this check fails, the
procedure shall return with a status of FRAME TOO LONG.
4.4.2 Outgoing frame key retrieval procedure
The inputs to this procedure are:
• the frame to be secured;
• SecurityLevel;
• KeyIdMode;
• KeySource;
• KeyIndex.
The outputs from this procedure are a passed or failed status and, if passed,
a key.
If the KeyIdMode parameter is set to KeyIdMode0 (i.e. implicit key iden-
tification), the outgoing frame key retrieval procedure shall determine the key
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Figure 4.3: Key retrieval procedure schema
lookup data and key lookup size as follows:
• if the short addressing mode is used, the key lookup data shall be set
to the 2-octets SourcePANIdentifier field of the frame right-concatenated
with the 2-octets macPANCoordShortAddress attribute, in turn right-
concatenated with the single octet 0x00. The key lookup size shall be set
to five;
• if the extended addressing mode is used, the key lookup data shall be set to
the 8-octet macPANCoordExtendedAddress attribute right-concatenated
with the single octet 0x00. The key lookup size shall be set to nine;
• if the Destination Addressing Mode subfield of the Frame Control field of
the frame is set to 0x02, the key lookup data shall be set to the 2-octet
Destination PAN Identifier field of the frame right-concatenated with the
2-octet Destination Address field of the frame and with the single octet
0x00. The key lookup size shall be set to five;
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• if the Destination Addressing Mode subfield of the Frame Control field of
the frame is set to 0x03, the key lookup data shall be set to the 8-octet
Destination Address field of the frame right-concatenated with the single
octet 0x00. The key lookup size shall be set to nine.
If the KeyIdMode parameter is set to a value not equal to KeyIdMode0, the
procedure shall determine the key lookup data and key lookup size as follows:
• if the KeyIdMode parameter is set to KeyIdMode1 (i.e. default key source
address), the key lookup data shall be set to the value of the 8-octet
macDefaultKeySource attribute right-concatenated with the single octet
KeyIndex parameter. The key lookup size shall be set to nine;
• if the KeyIdMode parameter is set to KeyIdMode2 (i.e. short address
key source), the key lookup data shall be set to the 4-octet KeySource
parameter right-concatenated with the single octet KeyIndex parameter.
The key lookup size shall be set to five;
• if the KeyIdMode parameter is set to KeyIdMode3 (i.e. extended address
key source), the key lookup data shall be set to the 8-octet KeySource
parameter right-concatenated with the single octet KeyIndex parameter.
The key lookup size shall be set to nine.
The procedure shall obtain the KeyDescriptor by passing the key lookup
data and the key lookup size to the KeyDescriptor lookup procedure.
If that procedure returns with a failed status, this procedure shall also return
with a failed status. The MAC sublayer shall set the key to the Key element
of the KeyDescriptor. The procedure shall return with a passed status, having
obtained the key identifier and the key as well.
4.4.2.1 Key descriptor lookup procedure
The inputs to this procedure are the key lookup data and the key lookup size.
The outputs from this procedure are a passed or failed status and, if passed, a
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KeyDescriptor.
The procedure, for each KeyDescriptor in the macKeyTable attribute and
for each KeyIdLookupDescriptor in the KeyIdLookupList of the KeyDescriptor,
shall check whether the LookupDataSize element of the KeyIdLookupDescrip-
tor indicates the same integer value as the key lookup size and whether the
LookupData element of the KeyIdLookupDescriptor is equal to the key lookup
data. If both checks pass, the procedure shall return with this (matching) Key-
Descriptor and a passed status.
Otherwise, the procedure shall return with a failed status.
4.5 Incoming frame security procedure
The input to this procedure is the frame to be unsecured. The outputs from
this procedure are:
• the unsecured frame;
• SecurityLevel;
• KeyIdMode;
• KeySource;
• KeyIndex;
• the status of the procedure.
All outputs of this procedure are assumed to be invalid unless and until
explicitly set in this procedure.
It is assumed the PIB attributes associating KeyDescriptors in macKeyTable
with a single, unique device or a number of devices will have been established
by the next higher layer.
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Fist of all, the procedure does some consistency controls and, if nothing
goes wrong, it moves on doing the incoming security level checking proce-
dure. If that fails, the procedure shall set the unsecured frame to be the
frame to be unsecured and return with the unsecured frame, the security level,
the key identifier mode, the key source, the key index, and a status of IM-
PROPER SECURITY LEVEL.
Otherwise, it proceeds with the incoming frame security material retrieval
procedure, described in Figure 4.6. It the procedure succedees, it passess the
KeyDescriptor, the frame type, and, depending on whether the frame is a
MAC command frame, the first octet of the MAC payload (i.e., command
frame identifier for a MAC command frame) to the incoming key usage policy
checking procedure.
Figure 4.4: Incoming frame security procedure schema
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If that procedure fails, the procedure shall set the unsecured frame to be
the frame to be unsecured and return with the unsecured frame, the security
level, the key identifier mode, the key source, the key index, and a status of
IMPROPER KE TYPE. It follows another checking phase, described in Figure
4.5.
If everything works, the procedure shall then use the ExtAddress element
of the DeviceDescriptor, the frame counter, the security level, and the Key
element of the KeyDescriptor to produce the unsecured frame according to the
CCM inverse transformation process.
If the security level specifies the use of encryption, the decryption operation
shall be applied only to the actual payload field within the MAC payload. If
the CCM inverse transformation process fails, the procedure shall return with
a status of SECURITY ERROR.
The procedure shall increment the frame counter and set the FrameCounter
element of the DeviceDescriptor to the resulting value. If the FrameCounter
element is equal to 0xffffffff, the procedure shall set the Blacklisted element
of the KeyDeviceDescriptor. The procedure shall return with the unsecured
frame, the security level, the key identifier mode, the key source, the key index,
and a status of SUCCESS.
4.5.1 Incoming frame consistency checks
Figure 4.5 describes the consistency checks we are going to enumerate. If the
Security Enabled subfield of the Frame Control field of the frame to be unse-
cured is set to zero, the procedure shall set the security level to zero.
If the Security Enabled subfield of the Frame Control field of the frame to
be unsecured is set to one and the Frame Version subfield of the Frame Control
field of the frame to be unsecured is set to zero, the procedure shall return with
a status of UNSUPPORTED LEGACY.
If the Security Enabled subfield of the Frame Control field of the frame
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Figure 4.5: Incoming frame consistency checks
to be unsecured is set to one, the procedure shall set the security level and
the key identifier mode to the corresponding subfields of the Security Con-
trol field of the auxiliary security header of the frame to be unsecured and
shall set the key source and key index to the corresponding subfields of the
Key Identifier field of the auxiliary security header of the frame to be unse-
cured, if present. If the resulting security level is zero, the procedure shall set
the unsecured frame to be the frame to be unsecured and return a status of
UNSUPPORTED SECURITY.
If the macSecurityEnabled attribute is set to FALSE, the procedure shall
set the unsecured frame to be the frame to be unsecured and return with the
unsecured frame, the security level, the key identifier mode, the key source, the
key index, and a status of SUCCESS if the security level is equal to zero and
with a status of UNSUPPORTED SECURITY otherwise.
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4.5.2 Incoming security level checking procedure
The procedure shall determine whether the frame to be unsecured meets the
minimum security level by passing the security level, the frame type, and,
depending on whether the frame is a MAC command frame, the first octet of
the MAC payload (i.e. command frame identifier for a MAC command frame)
to this procedure.
The inputs to this procedure are the incoming security level, the frame type
and the command frame identifier. The output from this procedure is a passed,
failed, or conditionally passed status.
The incoming security level checking for each SecurityLevelDescriptor in the
macSecurityLevelTable attribute:
• If the frame type is not equal to MAC command frame (0x03) and the
frame type is equal to the FrameType element of the SecurityLevelDe-
scriptor, the procedure shall compare the incoming security level with the
SecurityMinimum element of the SecurityLevelDescriptor. If this compar-
ison fails, the procedure shall return with a conditionally passed status
if the DeviceOverrideSecurityMinimum element of the SecurityLevelDe-
scriptor is set to TRUE and the security level is set to zero and with a
failed status otherwise;
• if the frame type is equal to MAC command frame (0x03), the frame
type is equal to the FrameType element of the SecurityLevelDescriptor,
and the command frame identifier is equal to the CommandFrameIdenti-
fier element of the SecurityLevelDescriptor, the procedure shall compare
the incoming security level with the SecurityMinimum element of the Se-
curityLevelDescriptor. If this comparison fails, the procedure shall return
with a conditionally passed status if the DeviceOverrideSecurityMinimum
element of the SecurityLevelDescriptor is set to TRUE and the security
level is set to zero and with a failed status otherwise;
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• If everything goes right, the procedure shall return with a passed status.
4.5.3 Incoming frame security material retrieval procedure
Figure 4.6: Incoming frame security material retrieval procedure schema
The input to this procedure is the frame to be unsecured. The outputs from
this procedure are a passed or failed status and, if passed, a KeyDescriptor, a
DeviceDescriptor, and a KeyDeviceDescriptor.
As Figure 4.6 describes, the procedure checks if the Key Identifier Mode
subfield of the Security Control field of the auxiliary security header of the
frame is set to KeyIdMode0. If so, the procedure shall determine the key lookup
data and the key lookup size as follows:
• if the source address mode of the FrameControl field is set to 0x00 and
the macPANCoordShortAddress attribute is set to a value in the short ad-
dressing mode is used, the key lookup data shall be set to the 2-octet Des-
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tination PAN Identifier field of the frame right-concatenated with the 2-
octet macPANCoordShortAddress attribute right-concatenated with the
single octet 0x00. The key lookup size shall be set to five;
• if the source address mode of the Frame Control field of the frame is
set to 0x00 and the extended addressing mode is used, the key lookup
data shall be set to the 8-octet macPANCoordExtendedAddress attribute
right-concatenated with the single octet 0x00. The key lookup size shall
be set to nine;
• if the source address mode of the Frame Control field of the frame is set to
0x02, the key lookup data shall be set to the 2-octet Source PAN Identifier
field of the frame, or to the 2-octet Destination PAN Identifier field of the
frame if the PAN ID Compression subfield of the Frame Control field of
the frame is set to one, right-concatenated with the 2-octet SourceAddress
field of the frame right-concatenated with the single octet 0x00. The key
lookup size shall be set to five;
• if the source address mode of the Frame Control field of the frame is set
to 0x03, the key lookup data shall be set to the 8-octet Source Address
field of the frame right-concatenated with the single octet 0x00. The key
lookup size shall be set to nine.
If the Key Identifier Mode subfield of the Security Control field of the auxil-
iary security header of the frame is set to a value not equal to KeyIdMode0, the
procedure shall determine the key lookup data and key lookup size as follows:
• if the KeyIdMode1 is used, the key lookup data shall be set to the 8-octet
macDefaultKeySource attribute right-concatenated with the 1-octet Key
Index subfield of the Key Identifier field of the auxiliary security header.
The key lookup size shall be set to nine;
• if the KeyIdMode2 is used, the key lookup data shall be set to the right-
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concatenation of the 4-octet Key Source subfield and the 1-octet Key
Index subfield of the Key Identifier field of the auxiliary security header.
The key lookup size shall be set to five;
• if the KeyIdMode2 is used, the key lookup data shall be set to the right-
concatenation of the 4-octet Key Source subfield and the 1-octet Key
Index subfield of the Key Identifier field of the auxiliary security header.
The key lookup size shall be set to five;
• if the KeyIdMode3 is used, the key lookup data shall be set to the right-
concatenation of the 8-octet Key Source subfield and the 1-octet Key
Index subfield of the Key Identifier field of the auxiliary security header.
The key lookup size shall be set to nine.
The procedure shall obtain the KeyDescriptor by passing the key lookup
data and the key lookup size to the KeyDescriptor lookup procedure. If that
procedure returns with a failed status, the procedure shall also return with a
failed status.
The procedure shall determine the device lookup data and the device lookup
size as follows:
• if the source address mode of the Frame Control field of the frame is
set to 0x00 (i.e. PAN identifier and address fields are not present) and
are used the short addresses, the device lookup data shall be set to the
2-octet Destination PAN Identifier field of the frame right-concatenated
with the 2-octet macPANCoordShortAddress attribute. The device lookup
size shall be set to four;
• if the source address mode of the Frame Control field of the frame is set to
0x00 and are used the extended addresses, the device lookup data shall be
set to the 8-octet macPANCoordExtendedAddress attribute. The device
lookup size shall be set to eight;
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• if the source address mode of the Frame Control field of the frame is set to
0x02 (i.e. Address field contains a 16-bit short address), the device lookup
data shall be set to the 2-octet Source PAN Identifier field of the frame,
or to the 2-octet Destination PAN Identifier field of the frame (if the PAN
ID Compression subfield of the Frame Control field of the frame is set
to one), right-concatenated with the 2-octet Source Address field of the
frame. The device lookup size shall be set to four;
• if the source address mode of the Frame Control field of the frame is set
to 0x03 (i.e. Address field contains a 64-bit extended address), the device
lookup data shall be set to the 8-octet Source Address field of the frame.
The device lookup size shall be set to eight.
The procedure shall obtain the DeviceDescriptor and the KeyDeviceDescrip-
tor by passing the KeyDescriptor, the device lookup data, and the device lookup
size to the blacklist checking procedure, described in Section 4.5.3.1.
If that procedure returns with a failed status, this procedure shall also re-
turn with a failed status too. Otherwise, the procedure shall return with a
passed status having obtained the KeyDescriptor, the DeviceDescriptor, and
the KeyDeviceDescriptor.
4.5.3.1 Blacklist checking procedure
The blacklist checking procedure for each KeyDeviceDescriptor in the KeyDe-
viceList of the KeyDescriptor:
• obtains the DeviceDescriptor using the DeviceDescriptorHandle element
of the KeyDeviceDescriptor;
• if the UniqueDevice element of the KeyDeviceDescriptor is set to TRUE,
the procedure shall return with the DeviceDescriptor and the KeyDe-
viceDescriptor. It returns a passed status if the BlackListed element of
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the KeyDeviceDescriptor is set to FALSE, or the procedure shall return
with a failed status if this Blacklisted element is set to TRUE;
• if the UniqueDevice element of the KeyDeviceDescriptor is set to FALSE,
the procedure shall execute the DeviceDescriptor lookup procedure with
the device lookup data and the device lookup size as inputs. If the cor-
responding output of that procedure is a passed status, the procedure
shall return with the DeviceDescriptor, the KeyDevice-Descriptor, and
a passed status if the Blacklisted element of the KeyDeviceDescriptor is
set to FALSE, or the procedure shall return with a failed status if this
Blacklisted element is set to TRUE.
Otherwise, the procedure shall return with a failed status.
4.5.4 Post-incoming frame security material retrieval consistency
checks
If the Exempt element of the DeviceDescriptor is set to FALSE and if the
incoming security level checking procedure of the step above obtained as output
the conditionally passed status, the procedure shall return with the unsecured
frame, the security level, the key identifier mode, the key source, the key index,
and a status of IMPROPER SECURITY LEVEL.
The procedure shall set the frame counter to the Frame Counter field of the
auxiliary security header of the frame to be unsecured. If the frame counter has
the value 0xffffffff, the procedure shall return a status of COUNTER ERROR.
The procedure shall determine whether the frame counter is greater than or
equal to the FrameCounter element of the DeviceDescriptor. If this check fails,
the procedure shall set the unsecured frame to be the frame to be unsecured
and return with the unsecured frame, the security level, the key identifier mode,
the key source, the key index, and a status of COUNTER ERROR.
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4.5.4.1 Incoming key usage policy checking crocedure
The procedure, for each KeyUsageDescriptor in the KeyUsageList of the Key-
Descriptor:
• if the frame type is not equal to 0x03 (i.e. MAC Command Frame) and the
frame type is equal to the FrameType element of the KeyUsageDescriptor,
the procedure shall return with a passed status;
• if the frame type is equal to 0x03, the frame type is equal to the FrameType
element of the KeyUsageDescriptor, and the command frame identifier is
equal to the CommandFrame-Identifier element of the KeyUsageDescrip-
tor, the procedure shall return with a passed status.
Otherwise, the procedure shall return with a failed status.
Chapter 5
Evaluations and future works
5.1 Image size
According to the tecnical feature of Tmote sky mentioned in Section 3.1, the
executable image size can not exceed 48K, otherwise it can not be installed on
the mote.
As a conclusion of the development phase, it has been made an evaluation
of the memory usage, comparing the TinyOS image size when security was not
implemented and when all the security features were fully implemented and
used (i.e. code and data structures). As Figure 5.1 shows, it came out that
security requires a not negligible amount of memory: about 7K for the RFDs
and 6K more for the coordinator. The reason for the security implementation
requiring more memory on the RFD than on the FFD Coordinator is that the
RFDs must be able to set a different SecLevel and KeyIdMode for each frame,
while the Coordinator just parses the frames’ header relying on the RFD’s
decisions. Observe that, in this implementation, only the Coordinator (RFDs)
receives (transmit) secured frames.
Going into more depth, it has been considered the costs of the implemen-
tation of single security features in terms of memory usage so distinguishing,
among different components, which one impacts more on the memory footprint.
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Figure 5.1: Security costs bar chart
Figure 5.2: Sender side security pie chart
5.1. Image size 64
Figure 5.3: Receiver side security pie chart
The security implementation consists in three main components: one for the
security data structures such as the key table or the device table, one for the
code to get and set the security data structures and one for the key modes setup
and management. As shown in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3, key management
structures need considerably less memory than other security components. It
also has been made an evaluation of the memory requirements when multiple
keys are used and came out it does not increase the image size considerably,
so, by employing a small amount of resources, a KeySource device is able to
provide more keys and change it more frequently, enhancing the robustness of
the security system.
Besides, it can be seen this pre-integration implementation of security in
TinyOS drains almost all the available memory left on Tmote sky. On the other
hand, integrating these features in the release 2.1.1 of TinyOS and writing ad
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hoc security modules and interfaces, the memory footprint reduced its size
considerably. This advatage is due to two important aspects: the first one is
the complete removal of printf() calls that determined the removal of the printf
driver from the image, saving some memory. The second one is the introduction
of interfaces, because the compiler is able to optimize the code exploiting the
call mechanism, which acts as an inline expansion of the function called.
5.2 Error Management
As explained in Chapter 4, implementig the MAC layer security operations, it
has been completed also the implementation of MAC layer security consistency
checks described by the standard, introducing all the provided ad hoc status
describing differnt kind of failures.
From the point of view of failure management, it would be useful to dis-
tinguish between general failure errors and different kinds of retry errors, that
can be easily faced by means of a second execution attempt. For example,
UNSUPPORTED SECURITY or FRAME TOO LONG could be treated as
FAIL errors, because, when they happen, no security operation can be car-
ried on successfully. On the contrary, an IMPROPER SECURITY LEVEL or
FRAME COUNTER ERROR status could be considered RETRY errors, be-
cause they are due to a temporary mismatch between security parameters which
would be successfully fixed with a retry.
The current implementation of the procedure just returns a FAIL/SUCCESS
status. It would be useful to return these status messages in case of failure,
so making it possible to exploit them for diagnostic purposes and improve
performances thanks to the above-mentioned distinction between FAIL and
RETRY errors.
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5.3 Test Application
The TestDataSecurity application has been developed in order to test the
discussed and implemented security features. This application represents a
security-modified version of the TestData application. The classical TestData
sees one or more RFDs continously sending packets to the coordinator in the
context of a beacon enabled PAN. The TestDataSecurity’s scenario consists
in some RFDs sending diffent kinds of secured packets to a FFD, acting as
a coordinator, which receives these secured packets and usecures them coher-
ently with KeyIdModes and SecLevels. The application still works in a beacon
enabled PAN.
5.3.1 Sender side
On the sender side, each RFD starts looking for an association to a PAN coor-
dinator, this is done easily thanks to the beacon the coordinator periodically
sends around the network. After that, it retrieves the key and creates secured
packets according to the Security Level it has been set for. Figure 5.4 shows a
screenshot of the execution output of a Tmote sky behaving as a RFD when
sending secured packets whose payload changes both in content and length.
5.3.2 Receiver side
On the receiver side, the PAN coordinator FFD periodically sends beacon to
allow the RFDs to join the network. Every time it receives a packet, it re-
trieves the key and unsecures the received packet, giving a feedback about
the decryption/authentication result. Figure 5.5 shows a screenshot of the ex-
ecution output of a tmote sky behaving as a PAN ccordinator and receiving
and unsecuring packets whose payload changes both in content and length and
come from different senders, which applies differnt SecLevels.
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Figure 5.4: Sender side execution screenshot
Figure 5.5: Receiver side execution screenshot
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5.4 Future works
The MAC layer security implementation preludes complex and useful utiliza-
tions in a wide range of monitoring applications which were claming for security
and authentication, especially for military and medical application fields.
For the future, it would be interesting to do some further testing activities
in more complex scenarios (e.g. to consider nodes both transmitting and re-
ceiving protected MAC frames). Furthermore, in order to have a full standard
implementation, it is necessary to provide some minor security mechanisms,
such as the opportunity to encrypt Beacon and Command frames. Moreover,
to improve these security mechanisms, it could be worthwhile, starting from
this implementation, to realize a run-time key distribution mechanism, for ex-
ample by exploiting KeyIdMode2 or KeyIdMode3 to retrieve keys. Run-time
key distribution requires concurrency management of security data structures
and a method to get and manage a writing lock on the key tables for both the
RFDs and the Coordinator. Depending on how it is implemented, the locking
could determine the loss of a small number of packets or the incorrect unse-
curing of some packets. However, these issues should be easily faced by means
of retransmissions.
An integration activity of this suite in the IEEE 802.15.4 implementation
of the TinyOS official release is currently ongoing, in cooperation with the
Technische Universitaet Berlin. According to the results achieved so far, it is
possible to noticeably reduce the memory footprint both on the RFDs and the
Coordinator by writing ad hoc security modules which are well-optimized by
the TinyOS’s building policy. In fact, when compiling a specific application,
the compiler introduces only the modules that the specific application needs.
However, the RFDs’ image size still remains bigger than the Coordinator’s one
because the computational load continues to be more on the sender side. By
completely removing the printf() calls, it is possible to further reduce the image
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size, having more available memory and being able to introduce security in more
complex application scenarios (i.e. much more memory would be available for
the application).
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The IEEE 802.15.4 security suite allows network nodes to protect communica-
tions by encrypting and authenticating MAC frames. Such security mechanisms
are provided by Tmote sky motes and their CC2420 chipset. This thesis work
extends the IEEE 802.15.4 TinyOS implementation, introducing security sup-
port on the Tmote sky platform. Security modules have been tested and their
impact on memory usage has been evaluated.
In particular, the realized security implementation makes it possible to pro-
tect MAC frames in different ways and manage dynamic security information
retrieval from specific data structures, according to different available criteria.
The security suite has been succesfully tested through a proper application,
which allows many sender nodes to securely communicate with a single receiver
node. Specifically, MAC data frames having payloads different in content and
size have been considered. Finally, a memory footprint of the RFD and FFD
code has been produced, highlighting how security impacts on memory usage
quite remarkably, almost draining all available motes’ memory.
For the future, it would be interesting to consider more complex testing
scenarios, include some still missing minor features, and realize a run-time
key distribution mechanism. An integration with the TinyOS official release is
currently ongoing, together with the Technical University of Berlin.
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Appendix A
MAC security procedures
A.1 Incoming frame security procedure
The following is the implementation of the consistency checks described in the
section 7.5.8.2.1 of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
The inputs to this procedure are the frame to be secured, the security pa-
rameters and the mic length. The output is the return status of the procedure.
i e e e 1 5 4 s t a t u s t f r ame s e cu r i t y p ro c edu r e
( i e e e 1 5 4 s e c u r i t y t ∗ s e cu r i t y , message t ∗ frame , u i n t 8 t mic l ength )
{
u i n t 8 t ∗mhr = MHR( frame ) ;
i e ee154 macSecur i tyEnab led t mac secur i ty enab l ed ;
u i n t 8 t pktLen = 0 ;
u i n t 8 t AddLen = 0 ;
u i n t 8 t SecLen = 0 ;
eee154 macFrameCounter t counter ;
e r r o r t e r r o r ;
i f (mhr [MHR INDEX FC1] == FC1 SECURITY ENABLED &&
( se cu r i t y−>Secur i tyLeve l == NO SEC) )
return IEEE154 UNSUPPORTED SECURITY;
mac secur i ty enab l ed = c a l l MLMEGET. macSecurityEnabled ( ) ;
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i f ( mac secur i ty enab l ed == FALSE &&
( se cu r i t y−>Secur i tyLeve l == NO SEC) )
return IEEE154 UNSUPPORTED SECURITY;
c a l l FrameUti l i ty . getAddress ingFie ldsLength
(mhr [MHR INDEX FC1] , mhr [MHR INDEX FC2] , &AddLen ) ;
pktLen += AddLen ;
c a l l FrameUti l i ty . getSecur i tyHeaderLength
(mhr [MHR INDEX FC1] , mhr [ AddLen ] , &SecLen ) ;
pktLen += SecLen ;
pktLen += c a l l Frame . getPayloadLength ( frame ) ;
pktLen += mic length ;
pktLen += 2 ;
i f ( pktLen > IEEE154 aMaxPHYPacketSize )
return IEEE154 FRAME TOO LONG;
counter = c a l l MLMEGET. macFrameCounter ( ) ;
i f ( counter == 0 x f f f f f f f f )
s e cu r i t y−>KeyIndex = ( s e cu r i t y−>KeyIndex + 1)%2;
e r r o r = k ey r e t r i e v a l p r o c e du r e
( frame , s e cu r i t y , s e cu r i t y−>KeyIndex ) ;
i f ( e r r o r != SUCCESS)
return IEEE154 UNAVAILABLE KEY;
return IEEE154 SUCCESS ;
}
A.2 Outgoing frame key retrieval procedure
This function is used in order to manage the key descriptor building procedure
described in the section 7.5.8.2.2 of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
The inputs to this procedure are the frame to be secured and the security
parameters. The outputs from this procedure is a SUCCESS/FAIL status and,
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in case of success, a key.
e r r o r t k e y r e t r i e v a l p r o c e du r e
( message t ∗ frame , i e e e 1 5 4 s e c u r i t y t ∗ s e cu r i t y , int key index )
{
e r r o r t e r r o r ;
u i n t 8 t ∗mhr = MHR( frame ) ;
e r r o r = key de s c r i p t o r l o okup proc edu r e ( 5 , (mhr [ 3 ] ) ) ;
i f ( e r r o r == FAIL)
return FAIL ;
return SUCCESS;
}
A.3 Incoming frame security procedure
The following implements the consistency checks described by section 7.5.8.2.3
of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, The inputs to this procedure is the frame to
be unsecured, the output is the status of the procedure.
i e e e 1 5 4 s t a t u s t f r ame s e cu r i t y p ro c edu r e
( i e e e 1 5 4 s e c u r i t y t ∗ mysec , u i n t 8 t ∗ mhr , u i n t 8 t mic l ength )
{
u i n t 8 t o f f s e t ;
i e e e 1 5 4 s t a t u s t s t a tu s = IEEE154 SUCCESS ;
i eee154 macSecur i tyEnab led t s e cu r i t y enab l ed ;
e r r o r t e r r o r ;
u i n t 8 t s e c l e v e l ;
ieee154 macFrameCounter t macCounter ;
ieee154 FrameType t frame type ;
i e e e 1 54 Dev i c eDe s c r i p t o r t ∗ d e v i c e d e s c r i p t o r = NULL;
i e e e154 KeyDesc r i p to r t ∗ k ey de s c r i p t o r ;
i f (mhr [MHR INDEX FC1] == FC1 SECURITY ENABLED &&
(mhr [MHR INDEX FC2] & FC2 FRAME VERSION MASK) == 0x00 )
s t a tu s = IEEE154 UNSUPPORTED LEGACY;
c a l l FrameUti l i ty . getAddress ingFie ldsLength
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(mhr [MHR INDEX FC1] , mhr [MHR INDEX FC2] , &o f f s e t ) ;
s e c l e v e l = mhr [ o f f s e t ] & SEC CNTL LEVEL;
i f (mhr [MHR INDEX FC1] == FC1 SECURITY ENABLED &&
s e c l e v e l == 0x00 && sta tu s == IEEE154 SUCCESS)
s t a tu s = IEEE154 UNSUPPORTED SECURITY;
s e cu r i t y enab l ed = c a l l MLMEGET. macSecurityEnabled ( ) ;
i f ( s e cu r i t y enab l ed == FALSE && sta tu s == IEEE154 SUCCESS)
s t a tu s = IEEE154 UNSUPPORTED SECURITY;
mysec−>Secur i tyLeve l = s e c l e v e l ;
mysec−>KeyIdMode = ( (mhr [ o f f s e t++] & 0x18)>> 3 ) ;
macCounter = ∗ ( ( nx u in t32 t ∗) (&(mhr [ o f f s e t ] ) ) ) ;
o f f s e t += 4 ;
i f (mysec−>KeyIdMode != KEYIDMODE0){
i f (mysec−>KeyIdMode == KEYIDMODE1)
mysec−>KeyIndex = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
else i f (mysec−>KeyIdMode == KEYIDMODE2){
mysec−>KeySource [ 0 ] = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
mysec−>KeySource [ 1 ] = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
mysec−>KeySource [ 2 ] = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
mysec−>KeySource [ 3 ] = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
mysec−>KeyIndex = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
}
else {
mysec−>KeySource [ 0 ] = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
mysec−>KeySource [ 1 ] = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
mysec−>KeySource [ 2 ] = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
mysec−>KeySource [ 3 ] = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
mysec−>KeySource [ 4 ] = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
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mysec−>KeySource [ 5 ] = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
mysec−>KeySource [ 6 ] = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
mysec−>KeySource [ 7 ] = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
mysec−>KeyIndex = mhr [ o f f s e t ++];
}
}
k ey de s c r i p t o r = c a l l MLMEGET. macKeyTable (mysec−>KeyIndex ) ;
d ev i c e d e s c r i p t o r−>f ramecounter = ++macCounter ;
i f ( d ev i c e d e s c r i p t o r−>f ramecounter == 0 x f f f f f f f f )
k ey de s c r i p to r−>k e y d e v i c e l i s t
[ mysec−>KeyIndex ] . b l a c k l i s t e d = TRUE;
frame type = mhr [MHR INDEX FC1] & FC1 FRAMETYPEMASK;
e r r o r = s e c l e v e l c h e c k i n g p r o c edu r e ( s e c l e v e l , frame type , 0 ) ;
i f ( ( ( e r r o r == FAIL) | |
( e r r o r == SUCCESS && cond i t i o n a l l y p a s s e d == TRUE) )
&& sta tu s == IEEE154 SUCCESS)
s t a tu s = IEEE154 IMPROPER SECURITY LEVEL ;
e r r o r = s e c u r i t y ma t e r i a l r e t r i e v a l p r o c e d u r e (mhr , mysec , 0 ) ;
i f ( e r r o r == FAIL && sta tu s == IEEE154 SUCCESS)
s t a tu s = IEEE154 UNAVAILABLE KEY;
e r r o r = key u sag e po l i c y che ck ing ( key de s c r i p to r , frame type , 0 ) ;
i f ( e r r o r == FAIL && sta tu s == IEEE154 SUCCESS)
s t a tu s = IEEE154 IMPROPER KEY TYPE;
return s t a tu s ;
}
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A.4 Incoming frame security material retrieval proce-
dure
This function is used in order to manage the security material retrieval pro-
cedure described in the section 7.5.8.2.4 of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. The
inputs to this procedure are the frame to be secured and the security parame-
ters. The outputs from this procedure is a SUCCESS/FAIL status and, in case
of success, a key.
e r r o r t s e c u r i t y ma t e r i a l r e t r i e v a l p r o c e d u r e ( u i n t 8 t ∗ mhr ,
i e e e 1 5 4 s e c u r i t y t ∗ secur i ty params , u i n t 8 t key index )
{
i eee154 macDefaul tKeySource t ∗ de f k ey s ou r c e = NULL;
e r r o r t e r r o r ;
i e e e154 LookupDesc r ip to r t d ev i c e l o okup t ab l e ;
i e e e154 KeyDesc r i p to r t ∗ k ey de s c r i p t o r = NULL;
i f ( secur i ty params−>KeyIdMode == KEYIDMODE0 | |
secur i ty params−>KeyIdMode == KEYIDMODE2)
e r r o r = key de s c r i p t o r l o okup pro c edu r e (5 , &(mhr [ 3 ] ) ) ;
else i f ( secur i ty params−>KeyIdMode == KEYIDMODE1){
de f k ey s ou r c e = c a l l MLMEGET. macDefaultKeySource ( ) ;
e r r o r = key de s c r i p t o r l o okup pro c edu r e (9 , d e f k ey s ou r c e ) ;
}
else
e r r o r = key de s c r i p t o r l o okup pro c edu r e (9 , &(mhr [ 3 ] ) ) ;
i f ( e r r o r == FAIL){
c a l l Leds . led0On ( ) ;
return FAIL ;
}
i f ( (mhr [MHR INDEX FC2] & FC2 DEST MODE MASK) ==
FC2 DEST MODE SHORT)
{
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dev i c e l o okup t ab l e . l ookupdata s i z e = 4 ;
d ev i c e l o okup t ab l e . lookupdata [ 0 ] = mhr [ 3 ] ;
d ev i c e l o okup t ab l e . lookupdata [ 1 ] = mhr [ 4 ] ;
d ev i c e l o okup t ab l e . lookupdata [ 2 ] = mhr [ 5 ] ;
d ev i c e l o okup t ab l e . lookupdata [ 3 ] = mhr [ 6 ] ;
}
e r r o r = b l a c k l i s t c h e c k i n g p r o c e du r e
( key de s c r i p to r , 5 , &(mhr [ 3 ] ) ) ;
i f ( e r r o r == FAIL){
c a l l Leds . led0On ( ) ;
return FAIL ;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
A.5 KeyDescriptor lookup procedure
According to the algorithm dascribed in the section 7.5.8.2.5 of the IEEE
802.15.4 standard, it makes some consistency controls over the retrieved key
descriptor. It takes as input the size of the key lookup table and the key lookup
data. It returns a SUCCESS/FAIL error t and, if passed, a valid KeyDescrip-
tor.
e r r o r t k ey de s c r i p t o r l o okup proc edu r e ( ieee154 LookUpDataSize t
key l ookup s i z e , ieee154 LookUpData t ∗ key lookup data )
{
u i n t 8 t i , j ;
u i n t 8 t l o okup da t a s i z e ;
u i n t 8 t mac key t ab l e en t r i e s ;
i e e e154 KeyDesc r i p to r t ∗ k ey de s c r i p t o r ;
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mac key t ab l e en t r i e s = c a l l MLMEGET. macKeyTableEntries ( ) ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < mac key t ab l e en t r i e s ; i++){
k ey de s c r i p t o r = c a l l MLMEGET. macKeyTable ( i ) ;
l o okup da t a s i z e =
( key de s c r i p to r−>key id l ookupde s c r i p to r [ 0 ] ) . l ookupdata s i z e ;
i f ( k ey l o okup s i z e != l o okup da t a s i z e )
return FAIL ;
for ( j = 0 ; j < l o okup da ta s i z e −1; j++){
i f ( k ey de s c r i p to r−>key id l ookupde s c r i p to r [ i ] . lookupdata [ j ]
!= key lookup data [ j ] )
return FAIL ;
}
}
return SUCCESS;
}
A.6 Blacklist checking procedure
According to the algorithm dascribed in the section 7.5.8.2.6 of the IEEE
802.15.4 standard, it makes some controls over the retrieved key descriptor
to check whether the key is valid or not. It takes as input the key descriptor
pointer, the size of the key lookup table and the key lookup data. The procedure
returns a SUCCESS/FAIL error t and, if passed, a valid KeyDeviceDescriptor
and a valid DeviceDescriptor.
e r r o r t b l a c k l i s t c h e c k i n g p r o c e du r e ( i e e e154 KeyDesc r i p to r t ∗
key descr , i eee154 LookUpDataSize t d ev i c e l o okup s i z e ,
ieee154 LookUpData t ∗ dev i c e l ookup data )
{
u i n t 8 t i ;
e r r o r t r e s u l t ;
i e e e 1 54 Dev i c eDe s c r i p t o r t ∗ d e v i c e d e s c r i p t o r ;
i e e e154 KeyDev i c eDesc r ip to r t ∗ k ey d ev i c e d e s c r i p t o r ;
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for ( i = 0 ; i < key descr−>k e y d e v i c e l i s t e n t r i e s ; i++){
k ey d ev i c e d e s c r i p t o r = &(key descr−>k e y d e v i c e l i s t [ i ] ) ;
d e v i c e d e s c r i p t o r = c a l l MLMEGET. macDeviceTable
( k ey dev i c e d e s c r i p t o r−>dev i c ed e s c r i p t o rhand l e ) ;
i f ( k ey dev i c e d e s c r i p t o r−>uniquedev ice == TRUE &&
key dev i c e d e s c r i p t o r−>b l a c k l i s t e d == FALSE)
return SUCCESS;
else i f ( k ey dev i c e d e s c r i p t o r−>uniquedev ice == FALSE){
r e s u l t = dev i c e d e s c r i p t o r l o okup p ro c edu r e
( d ev i c e d e s c r i p t o r , d ev i c e l o okup s i z e , dev i c e l ookup data ) ;
i f ( r e s u l t == SUCCESS &&
key dev i c e d e s c r i p t o r−>b l a c k l i s t e d == FALSE)
return SUCCESS;
}
}
return FAIL ;
}
A.7 DeviceDescriptor lookup procedure
According to the algorithm dascribed in the section 7.5.8.2.7 of the IEEE
802.15.4 standard, it makes some consistency controls over the retrieved device
descriptor. It takes as input the device descriptor pointer, the size of the device
lookup table and the device lookup data. It returns a SUCCESS/FAIL error t.
e r r o r t d ev i c e d e s c r i p t o r l o okup p ro c edu r e
( i e e e 1 54 Dev i c eDe s c r i p t o r t ∗ dev i c e de s c r ,
i eee154 LookUpDataSize t d ev i c e l o okup s i z e ,
ieee154 LookUpData t ∗ dev i c e l ookup data )
{
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ieee154 LookUpData t ∗ lookup data = NULL;
u i n t 8 t i ;
i f ( d e v i c e l o o kup s i z e == 4){
lookup data [ 0 ] = ( dev i c e de s c r−>panid ) & 0 x00 f f ;
lookup data [ 1 ] = ( ( dev i c e de s c r−>panid ) & 0 x f f 0 0 ) >> 8 ;
lookup data [ 2 ] = ( dev i c e de s c r−>address . shortAddress ) & 0 x00 f f ;
lookup data [ 3 ] =
( ( dev i c e de s c r−>address . shortAddress ) & 0 x f f 0 0 ) >> 8 ;
}
else i f ( d e v i c e l o o kup s i z e == 8){
lookup data [ 0 ] =
( dev i c e de s c r−>address . extendedAddress ) & 0 x000000 f f ;
lookup data [ 1 ] =
( ( dev i c e de s c r−>address . extendedAddress ) & 0 x0000 f f00 ) >> 8 ;
lookup data [ 2 ] =
( ( dev i c e de s c r−>address . extendedAddress ) & 0 x00 f f0000 ) >> 16 ;
lookup data [ 3 ] =
( ( dev i c e de s c r−>address . extendedAddress ) & 0 xf f000000 ) >> 8 ;
}
for ( i = 0 ; i < 4 ; i++){
i f ( dev i c e l ookup data [ i ] != lookup data [ i ] )
return FAIL ;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
A.8 Incoming security level checking procedure
This function is used in order to manage the incoming security level checking
procedure described in the section 7.5.8.2.8 of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
The inputs to this procedure is the incoming security level, a frame type and,
if needed, a command frame identifier. The output from this procedure is a
SUCCESS/FAIL status.
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e r r o r t s e c l e v e l c h e c k i n g p r o c edu r e ( u i n t 8 t sec1 ,
ieee154 FrameType t frame type ,
ieee154 CommandFrameIdent i f ier t command frame ident i f i e r )
{
u i n t 8 t e n t r i e s ;
u i n t 8 t i ;
u i n t 8 t sec2 ;
i e e e 1 5 4 S e cu r i t yDe s c r i p t o r t ∗ s e c u r i t y d e s c r ;
e n t r i e s = c a l l MLMEGET. macSecur i tyLeve lTableEntr ie s ( ) ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < e n t r i e s ; i++){
s e c u r i t y d e s c r = c a l l MLMEGET. macSecur ityLevelTable ( i ) ;
i f ( s e c u r i t y d e s c r−>frametype == frame type ){
i f ( f rame type == FC1 FRAMETYPECMD &&
se cu r i t y d e s c r−>commandframeident i f i er !=
command frame ident i f i e r )
return FAIL ;
sec2 = s e cu r i t y d e s c r−>securityminimum ;
i f ( ( ( sec1 & 0x04 ) < ( sec2 & 0x04 ) ) | |
( ( sec1 & 0x03 ) < ( sec2 & 0x03 ) ) ){
i f ( sec1 == NO SEC &&
se cu r i t y d e s c r−>d e v i c e o v e r r i d e s e c u r i t y == TRUE){
c ond i t i o n a l l y p a s s e d = TRUE;
return SUCCESS;
}
else
return FAIL ;
}
}
}
return SUCCESS;
}
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A.9 Incoming key usage policy checking procedure
This function implements the key usage policy checking procedure described in
the section 7.5.8.2.9 of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. The inputs to this proce-
dure are the KeyDescriptor, the frame type and the CommandFrameIdentifier.
The output from this procedure is a SUCCESS/FAIL status.
e r r o r t k ey u sag e po l i c y che ck i ng
( i e e e154 KeyDesc r i p to r t ∗ key descr ,
ieee154 FrameType t frame type ,
ieee154 CommandFrameIdent i f ier t command frame ident i f i e r )
{
u i n t 8 t e n t r i e s ;
u i n t 8 t i ;
e n t r i e s = key descr−>k e y u s a g e l i s t e n t r i e s ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < e n t r i e s ; i++){
i f ( key descr−> k eyu s a g e l i s t [ i ] . frametype == frame type ){
i f ( f rame type == FC1 FRAMETYPECMD &&
key descr−> k eyu s a g e l i s t [ i ] . commandframeident i f i er
!= command frame ident i f i e r )
return FAIL ;
}
else
return FAIL ;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Appendix B
TinyOS installation and setup
B.1 Installing TinyOS 2.1.1
B.1.1 Installing TinyOS 2.1.1 using TinyOS package repository
If you are running a version of Linux that supports Debian packages, the
TinyOS package repository can be used to get the latest version of TinyOS. It
can be done by means of the following instructions, as provided by [3].
• Remove any old TinyOS repository from the file /etc/apt/sources.list and
add the following line (supported distributions are edgy, feisty, gutsy,
hardy, jaunty, karmic, lucid):
deb http :// t i nyo s . s t an fo rd . edu/ t inyo s / d i s t s /ubuntu <d i s t r i bu t i o n> main
• Update your repository cache:
sudo apt−get update
• Run the following to install the latest release of TinyOS and all its sup-
ported tools:
sudo apt−get i n s t a l l t i nyo s
This will likely give you a message to choose between the two available
versions. As an example:
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sudo apt−get i n s t a l l t inyos −2.1 .1
• Add the following line to your ˜/.bashrc or ˜/.profile file in your home
directory to set up the environment for TinyOS development at login.
#Sourcing the t inyo s environment v a r i a b l e se tup s c r i p t
source /opt/ t inyos −2.1.1/ t i nyo s . sh
B.1.2 Installing TinyOS 2.1.1 using the TinyOS CVS
Another way to install TinyOS is by using the CVS located at [4].
• First of all, login to the CVS:
cvs −d : pse rve r : anonymous@tinyos . cvs . s ou r c e f o r g e . net : / cv s roo t / t i nyo s l o g i n
just skip when it asks for password;
• then download the correct module
cvs −z3 −d : pse rve r : anonymous@tinyos . cvs . s ou r c e f o r g e . net : / cv s roo t / t i nyo s
co −P modulename
where modulename is tinyos-2.x.
• Finally, set your enviroment variables as follows:
export TOSROOT=/home/roby/ tos / t inyos −2.x
export TOSDIR=$TOSROOT/ tos
export MAKERULES=$TOSROOT/ support /make/Makerules
export CLASSPATH=/home/roby/ tos / t inyos −2.x/ support / sdk/ java / :$CLASSPATH
This installation method allows you to install a new parallel version of
TinyOS if you already have one. Note that if you used the TinyOS debian
repository in the past, keep in mind that all of the tools have been updated for
TinyOS-2.1.1, but still work with all older versions of TinyOS as well. These
conflicts should be OK so long as you remove any old packages; they are due
to a change in the names of the updated packages installing into the same
locations as the outdated ones.
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B.2 NESCDT: An editor for nesC in Eclipse
the NESCEDT plugin is an editor for working with nesC code within Eclipse.
Fundamentally, it allows you just create a new nescdt project in Eclipse and
link those folders from your TinyOS installation and your application trees
that are needed. Built-in keywords (which you can change) are used for syntax
highlighting. The plugin does not touch, nor does it compete with your build
system: you still build your applications with a command-line make.
B.2.1 Installing NESCDT
Start Eclipse and use the update site at [2] in the Eclipse update manager. Then
save it in the Eclipse plugin directory (where the other jar plugins also reside).
It would usually be /opt/eclipse/plugins on Linux. Finally restart Eclipse.
B.2.2 Using the plugin
Create a new empty nescdt project as showed in Figure B.1 and name it what
you want to (for example nescdtsampleproject). When you open some .nc file
it will be syntax colored according some some predefined rules in the plugin.
There is auto-completion for keywords, types, and all other words found when
then plugin scanned the .nc files in the linked folders. Press CTRL + SPACE
to get the suggestions.
B.3 Compiling and installing a program
You compile TinyOS applications with the program make. TinyOS uses a pow-
erful and extensible make system that allows you to easily add new platforms
and compilation options. The makefile system definitions are located in tinyos-
2.x/support/make. If you don’t have mote hardware, you can compile it for
TOSSIM, the TinyOS simulator.
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Figure B.1: How to create a new nesC project with NESCDT
The first step is to check that your environment is set up correctly. Run the
tos-check-env command:
$ tos−check−env
This script checks everything that the TinyOS environment needs. If your
system says some command is not available and you downloaded from CVS,
then you need to compile and build the tools. Go to tinyos-2.x/tools/tinyos
and type:
$ con f i gu r e
$ make
$ make i n s t a l l
In order to install a program on a tmote sky, move to the program directory
and then give the following command:
$ make t e l o s i n s t a l l
If you need to give idetify a mote by means of a number which rapresents its
identity, then give:
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$ make t e l o s i n s t a l l ,<number>
B.4 The TinyOS printf library
In TinyOS debugging applications are very arduous. Debugging such a program
typically involves flashing the three available LEDs in some intricate sequences.
The TinyOS printf library helps debugging by providing the terminal printing
functionality to TinyOS applications through motes connected to a PC via
their serial interface. Messages are printed by calling printf() commands using
a familiar syntax borrowed from the C programming language. In order to use
this functionality, you simply need to include a single component in your top
level configuration file (PrintfC), and include a ”printf.h” header file in any
components that actually call printf() and printﬄush().
To install the application on the mote, run the following set of commands:
cd $TOSROOT\ t u t o r i a l s \Pr in t f
make t e l o s b i n s t a l l bs l , / dev/ttyUSBXXX
To see the output generated by the Printf tutorial application you need to start
the PrintfClient by running the following command:
java net . t i nyo s . t o o l s . P r i n t fC l i e n t −comm se r i a l@ /dev/ttyUSBXXX: t e l o s b
After resetting the mote, the following output should be printed to your screen:
Hi I am wr i t i ng to you from my TinyOS app l i c a t i on ! !
Here i s a u int8 : 123
Here i s a u int16 : 12345
Here i s a u int32 : 1234567890
After this first compilation, you can see the output of all your programs just
plugging them by the USB port and then providing the command:
java net . t i nyo s . t o o l s . P r i n t fC l i e n t −comm se r i a l@ /dev/ttyUSBXXX: t e l o s b
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